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Abstract  
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1 Introduction  
 
A business model in which a large organisation is partitioned into smaller interacting units has been 
well established for many years. Generalising somewhat, some of these sub-units may be actively 
engaging in producing products of the business.  In this paper we will refer to these as ‘Business Units’ 
(BU for short).  Others aid them in this process.  For example, they may provide and maintain IT systems, 
do catering, provide waste management facilities or carry out a supervisory function.  We will refer to 
these as ‘Services’.  The way in which Services interact with Business Units may be complex, but the 
basis of this service model is that ‘Business Units’ use services provided by ‘Services’.  See, for example, 
Levitt (1972) for a detailed discussion of a basic version of this model.  More recently the model has 
been modified to take into account new innovations in technology, and the idea of a ‘solution provider’ 
(SP for short) has emerged.  A summary of an enhanced ‘service’ business model is discussed in 
Cambridge (2011).  The type of service offered may be very specialist, and may thereby become part 
of the operational structure of the organisation that uses the service.  For example, the service may be 
to provide a cloud computing infrastructure, or to manufacture an essential component. In this way the 
SP becomes a component of production in its own right.   
 
The term ‘business model’ has been, and continues to be, used in many contexts. Magratta (2002) and 
Shafer et al (2005) provide some discussion of a more general context for the term ‘business model’.  
Broadly they cover the general area of ‘strategies for running a business’.  The service model outlined 
above is clearly one of these, but we will limit the discussion in this paper to a particular issue: that of 
allocation of a particular resource among BUs who have a relationship with SPs.  For reference, a wider 
discussion of ‘business model’ might cover items from the following list.  This list is not exhaustive. 
 
 Add-on model: there is a core product plus extras that can be bought 
 Franchise model: an organisation buys the right to trade under a particular name 
 Advertising model: an organisation derives its revenue from advertisers 
 Subscription model: the consumer pays for a resource no matter how much of that resource 
they use 
 Pay-as-you-go model: the consumer only pays for what is used. 
  
These and many any other are discussed by Lai et al (2006).  As discussed below, the Pay-as-you-go 
model is an essential part of the Shapley allocation process, which we will apply to the allocation 
problem which is the subject of this paper.   
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2 Diversification and Allocation in Operational Risk 
 
In this section we introduce the relevant elements of this analysis: service types, the value of a BU, 
diversification, and allocation. 
 
 
2.1 Service Types 
In this paper we distinguish between two types of service.  In the first, a BU buys a service from a SP, 
thereby adding to the total cost of production. There is a real flow of cash from the BU to the SP. For 
example, the BU buys IT services, or pre-fabricated parts, etc.  Overall, the service may be bought 
because it is more cost effective to do so than to provide the service ‘in house’.  Alternatively, there 
may be an accounting justification for buying a service.  In the second type of service, the SP provides 
a service which reduces a cost to the BU.  There may be no actual cash flow, but there is an implied 
cash flow from the SP to the BU.  An example is a risk department.  Its job is to reduce and manage the 
risks taken by other business units so that the aggregated amount of losses is lower than if the risk 
department was not present. Up to a certain extent, the income of the risk department is equal to the 
theoretical amount the risk department enables it to save. 
We will analyse a basic service model in terms of a particular context.  Each BU must pay an amount 
of cash hereinafter termed ‘capital’.  The total amount to be paid is known, but the amount to be paid 
by each BU has to be determined.  In other words, there must be an allocation of capital to the BUs.  
Each BU is a risk taker, and interacts with the two types of service.  Each BU buys services that allow 
it to function (e.g. IT support). Effectively the amount of capital payable by each BU is increased by 
having to pay for the service.  Each BU also benefits from the services of a risk department that allows 
them to function better (i.e. with reduced risk). The risk management service reduces the amount of 
capital payable by each BU. The overall effect is a balance in the flow of capital to and from each BU.   
 
2.1.1 Definitions: receiver and emitter Service Provider 
A service (such as Risk Management) which reduces capital payable by a BU will be termed a 
‘receiver’ of capital.  Such a SP effectively receives capital from the BU, and transmits it for use in 
another part of the organisation.  A service (such as IT) which increases capital payable by a BU will 
be termed an ‘emitter’ of capital.  If the initial capital of an emitter SP is zero (because its ‘riskiness’ 
is zero), it will end up with a negative capital after transfer to BUs.  In terms of game theory, the game 
defined by the BUs and SPs in an organisation, with rules that determine how capital should be 
transferred, is zero-sum. 
There is generally an interaction between a receiver SP such as Risk Management, and an emitter SP 
such as IT. The receiver sees the emitter SP as another business unit, and the emitter sees the receiver 
similarly.  In the specific case of Risk Management and IT, Risk Management receives capital from 
IT, thereby reducing the capital of IT.  Figure 1 shows a generalised case of capital flow, with a group 
of n BUs, B1, B2, …, Bn, one emitter SP (E) and one receiver SP (R).  The receiver does not retain 
capital: it routes capital to a ‘reinvestment’ pot. 
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Fig 1: Capital Flows 
B1 B2 BnBr... ...
E R
Reinvest
 
There can also be a contagion effect associated with a problem due business disruption of a SP such 
as IT.  An example is the RBS/NatWest cash machine failure in December 2013.  See IBTimes (2013) 
for example.  Customers were unable to use cash machines, do online banking, and direct debits were 
not collected.  The cost to a BU is therefore not just a fee payable: it has to absorb costs of a failure, 
which may be considerable. 
 
2.2 Riskiness and Value 
Given that the BUs in this analysis are risk-takers, the extent to which they take risks is important.  We 
use the term ‘riskiness’ in a very loose sense to indicate a degree of risk that a BU undertakes.  
‘Riskiness’ may be measured precisely.  The list below shows several ways in which ‘riskiness’ could 
be measured, with respect to a given historic time period. 
 Measure the mean or maximum loss incurred by the BU  
 Calculate value-at-risk (VaR) or expected shortfall (ES) of simulated losses 
 Informed scoring by domain experts 
We will use the term ‘riskiness’ to mean an assessment of risk incurred, and measured by any of the 
above methods, or any other appropriate method. We also use the term ‘value’, which is more common 
in game theory, to be synonymous with ‘riskiness’. 
In our case, we are trying to allocate capital obtained from a risk based methodology. Therefore, the 
riskiest BU, who generates the largest loss amount, would require more capital to cover their risks. 
Unfortunately this strategy is neither risk management sensitive or fair: it does not reward the BU who 
is trying to manage its risk in the best way possible. 
It is assumed in this paper that no BU is ‘dominant’ over any others.  We use the term loosely here to 
indicate that a particular BU may be able to influence its capital allocation more than others.  The issue 
of dominance required separate analysis, and there is no definitive formal definitions of ‘dominance’. 
A discussion in a very different context (aircraft landing fees) may be found in Littlechild and Owen 
(1973), and Littlechild and Thompson (1977). 
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.57
2.3 Diversification 
When operational risk is measured in terms of a calculated capital value, if the losses for all BUs are 
aggregated, the capital value of the aggregation is expected to be less than the sum of capital values of 
all the BUs.  The discrepancy is a measure of ‘diversification’.  More directly, diversification can be 
measured as a multiplicative factor of the sum of capital values of all the BUs. In some cases the 
operational risk diversification can appear to be huge due to an averaging effect of combining losses.  
A fuller account of the diversification effects on capital value is given by Monti et al (Monti 2010).  
They link diversification to the dependency structure between operational risk UoMs, estimated via 
correlations.   
2.4 Pro Rata Allocation 
'Pro Rata' allocation is an intuitive allocation method, which appears to be 'fair'.  Allocation is in 
proportion to some measureable metric: very often 'usage'.  'Pro Rata' allocation does not account for 
the benefits of cooperation: it rests solely on the measured metric. 
Given a group of n business units B1, B2,…,Bn, with respective values (i.e. riskiness) v1, v2,…,vn,  the 
Pro Rata allocation to business unit r, PR(r), is given by (1), with V = v1 + v2 + … + vn, (which is the 
total amount to be allocated): 
   r
r
r vV
V
v
BPR 





          (1) 
 
2.5 Shapley Allocation 
In this analysis we apply the Shapley allocation method to allocate capital to a large number of BUs, 
and introduce SPs as a necessary part of the allocation. Shapley’s achievement was to propose, a set of 
rules to define ‘fairness’ in allocation, an allocation formula supported by an associated algorithm for 
applying it, and a proof that shows that the algorithm derives the optimal (i.e. the ‘fairest’) allocation.  
The original paper is in (Shapley 1953).  His method has been used extensively ever since, and he 
received the 2012 Nobel Prize for Economics in recognition for its importance.   
Shapley's original allocation formula gives the allocation for a member i, in a coalition C, as 
𝜑𝑖 = ∑
(𝑠 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑠)!
𝑛!
[𝑣(𝑠) − 𝑣(𝑠\{𝑖})]
 
𝑖∈𝐶
. 
            (2) 
where v(•) is the 'value' (i.e. riskiness) of the coalition, s, and n is the number of members in C.  The 
notation has been changed slightly from the original. The important points to note here are that each 
coalition s has a 'value', and the term [v(s) - v(s-i)], which represents marginal value added when 
member i joins coalition s. This term is an important feature of the analysis of this paper.  The sum term, 
with division by n! indicates a calculation of a mean value, and the term (𝑠 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑠) indicates that 
all permutations of s need to be considered. 
Shapley allocation is, in principle, a 'fair' allocation method because it accounts for the benefits of 
forming coalitions.  This could be translated into working efficiently in a professional environment.  
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The justification "Shapley allocation is the fairest means of allocation because business units are 
charged only for losses they incur" is the reasoning most likely to be seen as credible. 
 
2.5.1 Problems in applying the Shapley Allocation 
Shapley's allocation formula, equation (2), implies an algorithm for calculating Shapley values which 
gives an insight into the method that equation (2) does not.  The algorithm proceeds by considering all 
permutations of players.  For each permutation, the marginal effect of a new player to an existing 
coalition is considered.  The Shapley value is then the mean value of the marginal contributions for 
each player. 
Applying this algorithm illustrates three points.  First, if all participants cooperate, it is possible to 
reduce the amount allocated to each of them relative to the 'Pro Rata' method.  Second, although values 
of intermediate coalitions are needed, in practice they do not exist explicitly.  They have to be estimated 
by an appropriate method.  Third, the combinatorial complexity of using the algorithm for a large 
number of participants is immense.  In practice, ‘large’ means six or more.  Typically we would deal 
with 8 to 20 BUs, and in some cases many more.  We therefore have to develop an allocation method 
that can cope with the combinatorial problems associated with a large number of BUs in the Shapley 
process. 
If it is not feasible to examine all permutations of all members of a coalition, the possibility of sampling 
exists, but only in conjunction with a way to find the value of all coalitions in the sample. Liben-Nowell 
et al (Liben-Nowell 2012), and Castro et al (Castro 2009) give an account of some sampling strategies, 
with an indication of sample size required.  We have found that approximately 250000 samples are 
needed to give allocations close to the exact outcomes for a total of five BUs. 
Consequently, we propose an alternative approach, which implements the Shapley algorithm implied 
by equation (2), but avoids the associated pitfalls. 
 
2.6 Allocation to a service: a general context 
The Shapley method has been applied to the problem of allocating service costs in many situations.  We 
mention a small selection. 
Linhart et al (1995) allocate the fixed cost of caller IDs (which is the service) in the context of companies 
in a telecommunications system.  They use two methods: Shapley and 'Incremental Recording'.  For the 
latter method they allocate points to each company involved in a call, and then allocate using the Pro 
Rata method, based on accumulated points.  They model the service cost by a linear function of the 
number of identifiable incoming calls.  We will use a similar idea for modelling added value when there 
are a large number of participants.  
Butler and Williams (2006) share fixed cost in a general context of 'facilities' and 'customers', using an 
Integer Programming technique.  They formalise a concept of 'fair' allocation: savings are equalised 
over all possible consortia, thereby providing a parallel with the Shapley method. 
Junqueira et al (2007) use the Aumann-Shapley method (Aumann and Shapley 1974) to allocate service 
costs in the context of networked users in an energy market. 'Fair' allocation implies that the charge for 
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a service is proportional to the degree of use of that service, and to efficient location of the service.  
They consider a network with about 10000 nodes, and simulate the marginal cost of transmission by a 
linearized power flow model.  In many ways this method has a parallel with the methods proposed in 
this paper, in that a small number of parameters apply for all nodes. 
Dehez (2011) provides comprehensive accounts of fixed cost allocation and the theory behind the 
Shapley method, and also gives a simple numerical example 
 
3  Shapley Allocation of Capital charges 
In this section we apply allocation of capital charges using the Shapley algorithm.  The starting point is 
a game played between n Business Units B1, B2,…,Bn, with a service S, making n+1 players in all.  The 
service can be one of two types: emitter or receiver.  The allocation game is zero-sum, so if there are 
winners, there must also be losers.  Looking at this another way, any initial capital value is redistributed 
in the allocation process, with no inflow or outflow of capital.  Each player is associated with a 
‘value/riskiness’.  A ‘risky’ business unit has a high value, and a less ‘risky’ business unit has a low 
value.  It is possible for a BUs value to be negative.  The interpretation is that the BU must be paid a 
capital charge, rather than having to pay the charge. 
In this paper we use terms from game theory, since allocation is often studied as part of game theory.  
In particular, the terms ‘Business Unit’ and ‘BU’ will be used synonymously with the term 'player' from 
game theory.  The term 'coalition' means a collection of players who cooperate.   
 
3.1  Shapley formulation 
In some contexts, for example operational risk, capital values of coalitions are not immediately available.  
Even if they were, if there are many players there is a considerable combinatorial problem in finding a 
solution by the Shapley method. Furthermore, the final results must be seen as 'fair' in a 'business as 
usual' sense.  We therefore make assumptions.to make the problem tractable, and to emphasise the effect 
of the service. 
 The value of a coalition comprising a subset of the “B” business units is the sum of 
values of the business units in the subset.  This implies that any coalition of “B” 
business units is not diversified. 
 The service S has zero initial value. 
 If S is a member of a coalition with subset of the “B” business units, the value of the 
coalition is the sum of values of the “B” business units, multiplied by a constant factor.  
S allows a diversification for the other members of the coalition  
 All “B” business units are equivalent in the way they are analysed.  Only the service is 
different. 
 
 
3.2  Notation 
The 'value', v(B), of a single player B is a measure of the risk associated with B (i.e. its ‘riskiness’). For 
example, in operational risk this might be a suitable quantile on a fitted loss distribution. The number 
of players in a coalition C is denoted by |C|. 
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Let J be an indexing set for a subset of the integers 1..n.  Then ⋃ (𝐵𝑗)𝑗𝜖𝐽  denotes a coalition of |J| 
members. 
The value of an individual player Br (i.e. a player not in a coalition) will be denoted by vr.  More 
generally, the value of any coalition C will be denoted by v(C).   
The marginal allocation to a player B will be denoted by M(B), with a subscript when appropriate.  This 
is the difference in values of an existing coalition before and after B joins.   
A cost function defines how the addition of a new player P to a coalition C affects the value of that 
coalition. In this paper, cost functions will be defined explicitly.   
The Shapley value of player Br is denoted by SH(n, r).  At a later stage we will compare the Shapley 
allocation to Br with the corresponding allocation derived from the Pro Rata method, which will be 
defined when the comparison is made.  The Pro Rata value of player Br is denoted by PR(n, r).   
 
3.3  Numerical examples 
In advance of deriving results in a general case of n players, we will consider two short numerical cases 
to illustrate the role of two distinct types of service.  In the first case, the service transfers capital from 
the “B” business units to the service.  In the second case, the service transfers capital to the “B” business 
units from the service.  Both types of service should carry risk capital in their own right, but does not. 
The global diversification benefit is obtained from the largest coalition possible (the 'grand' coalition).   
 Following the numerical examples, we demonstrate that there is a closed-form expression for the 
Shapley allocation for any of the players in the domain, given the distinction between service and 
business unit. 
 
3.3.1  Shapley analyses by enumeration of cases 
In this paper we do not intend to give a detailed explanation of the process for calculating a Shapley 
value.  The literature does not abound with such explanations, and those that exist tend to be short of 
detail. Garcia-Diaz and Lee (2013) provide a simple example, but it is not set out in a useful form. 
Dehez (2011) gives another example, with a good exposition of the supporting theory of the Shapley 
method. Tarashev et al (Tarashev 2009) show a similar calculation using operational risk capital 
values.  They use a tabular form, but do not clarify the point that it is useful to group all marginals for 
a player in the same column. 
The essential principle embodied in Equation (1) is to enumerate all permutations of players, and for 
each permutation, the marginal contribution to each coalition when a new member enters. As an 
example, suppose that there are five “B” players B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5, with a service S.  Consider 
one of the 6! coalitions:  {B2, B3, S, B1, B4, B5}.  B2 enters first, and its marginal value is v(B2), which 
should be attributed to B2 (i.e. placed “in the B2 column”). Then B3 enters, and the marginal value 
attributed to B3 is v(B3, B2) - v(B2).  All other members of the coalition are processed in the same way.  
When all such coalitions have been considered, the Shapley value of each player is calculated as the 
mean value of the marginals for each player. 
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The process described above is easy to apply for a small number of players (<6), but when more are 
involved, it is useful to adopt an alternative technique.  This is to consider each player at a time, and 
calculate the marginals for that player when it is first to enter the coalition, second to enter the 
coalition, third to enter the coalition, and so on.  We use this approach in the general case of n players, 
but we have to be careful to consider the effect of the service.  
 
3.3.2  Simple Shapley examples 
In order to illustrate the effects of emitter and receiver services, take the case of two business units, 
first with a receiver service, and then with an emitter service.  The cost function for each is small 
enough to be defined in terms of a table of values of all possible coalition.  
Table 1B shows the table of values for coalitions of a receiver service. The values of the two business 
units together is simply the sum of their stand-alone values.  If the service joins either one of them, or 
both of them, in a coalition, the service is able to reduce their values by 10%.  Table 1A shows the 
resulting Shapley analysis. 
Table 1A           Table 1B 
Permutation S B1 B2  Coalition Value 
S B1 B2 0 63 27  B1 70 
S B2 B1 0 27 63  B2 30 
B1 S B2 -7 70 27  S 0 
B1 B2 S -10 70 30  B1 B2 100 
B2 S B1 -3 63 30  B1 S 63 
B2 B1 S -10 70 30  B2 S 27 
Sum -30 363 207  B1 B2 S 90 
Shapley -5 60.5 34.5    
 
The Pro Rata allocations corresponding to the Shapley allocations in Table 1A are the stand-alone 
values v(B1)  = 70 and v(B2)  = 30.  Both are greater than their corresponding Shapley values.  The 
sum of Shapley values is equal to the value of the Grand Coalition, 90.  The difference 10-90 = 10 
represents the saving due to the service.  In practice, this amount would be used for investment in the 
business.  Perhaps it should be awarded to the service! 
Tables 2A and 2B show the contrasting case of an emitter service.  If the service joins either one of 
the business units or both of them in a coalition, the service increases their values by 10%.   
Effectively the service frustrates activities of the business unit(s). 
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Table 2A           Table 2B 
Permutation S B1 B2  Coalition Value 
S B1 B2 0 77 33  B1 70 
S B2 B1 0 33 77  B2 30 
B1 S B2 7 70 33  S 0 
B1 B2 S 10 70 30  B1 B2 100 
B2 S B1 3 77 30  B1 S 77 
B2 B1 S 10 70 30  B2 S 33 
Sum 30 397 233  B1 B2 S 110 
Shapley 5 66.17 38.83    
 
This time the value of the Grand Coalition is 110, which is again equal to the sum of the Shapley 
values.  Only B1 benefits from this arrangement in achieving a lower allocation than under Pro Rata 
allocation. 
 
3.3.3  A Shapley analysis with n Business Units and one Service  
We now extend and formalise the previous numerical cases to the general case of n (>1) business units 
and one service (i.e. n+1 players altogether).  The result below is simple to state, but complex to prove. 
 
Proposition 1 
Consider n players B1, B2,…,Bn, who are business units, with respective values v1, v2,…,vn,, and a 
service S with zero value.  Define a cost function implicitly by stating the values of coalitions, as in the 
group of equations (3).   In (3), J is an indexing subset of the integers 1..n, and d is a real number in the 
range (0.1).   
v(Br) =  vr, 1 ≤ r ≤ n  
v(S) = 0 
  










Jj
j
Jj
j vBv    
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
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
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
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j vdBSv 1          (3) 
Then the Shapley values of the players S and Br (1 ≤ r ≤ n) are given by  
  


n
j
jv
d
SSH
12
                   (4A) 
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  jr v
d
BSH
2
2
  1 ≤ r ≤ n                  (4B) 
d is termed the diversification factor and is typically 0.2 or less.  A diversification factor measures the 
extent to which the service can influence the business units: typically 20% or less.  If d > 0, the 
service is a receiver: SH(S) is negative.  If If d > 0, the service is an emitter. SH(S) is positive. 
A proof is given in Appendix A.  The result of this model is that the Shapley allocation of a player Br 
is simply its value modified a simple function of d.  How to determine a value d will be addressed 
later in this paper.   
As a check on the result, the sum of all allocations should be equal to the value of the grand coalition, 
which is (d+1)V.  The sum of allocation is, using (4A) and (4B), 
 
  required. as  ,1
2
2
2
2
2
2
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
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
 
  
In general, the idea of defining a standard way to treat the diversification value for all coalitions 
mirrors the approaches of Linhart et al (Linhart 1995), and Junqueira et al (Junqueira 2007).   
 
3.3.4  Comparison with Pro Rata allocation 
The Pro Rata allocations corresponding to Equation (4B) are given by equation (1).  Since the service 
has value zero, PR(S) = 0, which corresponds to (4A).   
The difference between the Shapley and Pro Rata allocations is then, from (1) and (4A) 
0 that   provided   0)()(
22
2
)()(






 

dBSHBPR
dv
v
d
vBSHBPR
rr
r
rrrr
      (5) 
On the other hand, for the service, 
0 that provided   0)()(
2
0)()(


dSSHSPR
dV
SSHSPR
 
Since S is a receiver service, the condition d < 0 applies.  For BUs, the Pro Rata allocation clearly 
exceeds the Shapley allocation, which means that the task of explaining the allocation to managers of 
BUs is easy: their allocation is less than it might have been.  The service has acquired a capital charge, 
which it passes on for reinvestment.  Furthermore, no one player has been treated more favourably than 
any another. Note that without the diversification benefit, the Shapley and Pro Rata allocations would 
be equal.  Besides, Pro Rata does not apply to departments that do not contribute to income, losses, etc., 
i.e. if a unit does not generate income then it would not be allocated capital.  
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3.3.5  Extension to two contrasting services 
The subject matter of Proposition 1 was a group of n BUs with a single service.  In this section we 
consider the case of two services: one emitter (service E) and one receiver (service R), with an 
interaction between the two services.  Furthermore, the diversification factors for each service need 
not be equal.  Let dE and dR be the respective diversification factors for the emitter and the receiver. 
From the viewpoint of the receiver service, the emitter service can be treated as the (n+1)th business 
unit.  Therefore, using (4A), 
  V
d
v
d
RSH R
n
j
j
R
2
0
2 1








 

.       (6A) 
Similarly, the emitter service sees the receiver as the (n+1)th business unit.  Therefore, using (4A) 
again,  
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d
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j
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2
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
.       (6B) 
Each BU interacts with two services.  Let the combined diversification factor, as experienced by each 
BU, be d’.  To evaluate d’, we use the fact that the value of the Grand Coalition is equal to the sum of 
Shapley values of all players.  The value of the Grand Coalition is, using equation (3), the sum of 
values of all players, multiplied by a factor (1+d’).  Therefore 
   






 
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d
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V
d
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1 2
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22
'100 , from which d’ =  dE + dR    
Therefore, from (4B) 
  j
RE
r v
dd
BSH
2
2
  1 ≤ r ≤ n       (6C) 
The result in equation (6C) illustrates the additive nature of games. 
 
4  Application To Loss Data 
In this section we apply the closed-form Shapley formulae (6A, 6B and 6C) to loss data for a collection 
of 11 BUs, each having sustained losses over the past five years. The receiver service (the “Risk 
department”) has moderated those losses, and an emitter service (the “IT department”) has worsened 
those losses by charging for its service.  By noting total annual losses for each BU in discrete time 
periods, a loss correlation matrix, representing the dependency structure of the BUs, was calculated. 
The correlation matrix was used in conjunction with several copulas to calculate a correlated VaR loss 
value.  The copulas considered were: Gaussian, Student-t, Gumbel, Clayton and Frank. The correlated 
VaR value was then compared with the VaR value derived from uncorrelated data.  The overall 
diversification factor, d’, was the associated with the mean percentage reduction in VaR due to 
correlation over all copulas.   The mean result was 4.47%, giving d’ = -0.0447.  The factor used is 
negative since it represents an overall reduction in capital for the BUs. 
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The ‘riskiness’ values of the 11 BUs, and the value of the Grand Coalition, were obtained using 
empirical distribution parameters, and are listed in Table 3. The Shapley allocations, obtained using 
equation (6C) are shown alongside.   
Table 3: Business Unit values 
BU, r Value (Riskiness)(€m) Shapley Allocation (€m) 
1 33.69 32.94 
2 28.81 28.17 
3 37.21 36.38 
4 20.14 19.69 
5 36.77 35.95 
6 35.34 34.55 
7 35.59 34.79 
8 66.27 64.79 
9 32.27 31.55 
10 33.76 33.01 
11 35.04 34.26 
Totals 394.89 386.06 
   
The difference 394.89 – 386.06 = 8.82 (€m) represents the net value of the Risk Department to the 
organisation as a whole. 
In order to estimate the individual diversification factors dE and dR, it is necessary to estimate either the 
capital reduction due to the Risk Department, or the capital added by the IT Department.  Ang and 
Straub (1998) estimate the charge for IT services to be in the range 15-20%, so we take the midpoint 
and set dE ~ 0.15.  This gives  dR   ~ d’ - dE  ~ -0.19.  Then, using (6A) and (6B), 
SH(R) ~ -38.4 (€m) 
SH(E) ~ 29.6 (€m)          (7) 
The interpretation of the results in (7) is that the Risk Department reduces risk inherent in the BUs by 
about 10%, and the IT Department increases it by about 7.5%.  Table 3 shows that each BU has a 
reduced capital relative to Pro Rata allocation. 
The important question at this stage is "will this allocation be seen as fair by business units?".  To 
answer this we can provide the following indicators. 
 All capital values are reduced.  
 No business unit can argue that any particular business unit is favoured over any other: they all 
have the same percentage capital reduction.. 
 In order for services to survive, function properly and be of benefit to business functions (by 
reducing losses, costs and expenses), they should be allocated part of the total capital.   
We stress that dominant new entrants to a coalition are not modelled in this analysis, where 'dominant' 
indicates that a new entrant has a more significant effect on a coalition than other players.  The 
assumption throughout this analysis is that all players are equivalent in the way they add value to a 
coalition.   
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 5  Conclusion 
We have proposed an allocation methodology that is applicable to a large number of BUs, including 
two types of service: an emitter which increases capital payable by BUs, and a receiver which does the 
opposite.   Using the Shapley method, we can account for diversification by considering coalitions.  For 
the intended number of BUs (8-100), it is not feasible to do exact calculations for two reasons.  First, 
the combinatorial complexity prevents it.  Second, there is no standard way to calculate the value of a 
coalition.  We therefore assume that all BUs contribute to a coalition in the same way, so that they each 
add their own value to the coalition when they enter it, provided that a service is not already in the 
coalition..  If it is, the sum of values of BUs in the coalition is multiplied by a diversification factor. 
This way of defining a cost function is open to modification or replacement as required, with the 
warning that Proposition 1 should be reworked if changes are made. 
There are three principal results of this analysis. 
1. The allocations of all UoMs decrease relative to their Pro Rata allocations, which makes the 
result acceptable to BU managers.  
2. We have derived closed-form expressions for Shapley allocations, which can be used for a large 
number of UoMs, and take negligible computation time. 
3. We have modelled a service as an entity that moderates the capital of UoMs by either absorbing 
capital from them or adding capital to them. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
B1, B2,…,Bn are n players who are business units, with respective values v1, v2,…,vn,, and S is a service 
with zero value.  The values of possible coalitions are given by equations (3), as in the main text.  J is 
an indexing subset of the integers 1..n, and d is a real number in the range (0.1).   
v(Br) =  vr, 1 ≤ r ≤ n  
v(S) = 0 
  
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Then Then the Shapley values of the players S and Br (1 ≤ r ≤ n) are given by  
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

Jj
jv
d
SSH
2
                   (4A) 
  jr v
d
BSH
2
2
  1 ≤ r ≤ n                             (4B) 
Proof 
The proof proceeds in three parts. First, by considering cases where S enters the coalition.  This 
proves result (4A).  Second, by considering cases where Bi enters before S, and third, where Bi enters 
after S.  The second and third results together will give equation (4B). 
Part 1: S enters the coalition 
We consider cases where S is first to enter a coalition, then second, third and so on, up to last to enter. 
Let V = v1 + v2 +…+ vn 
Consider the case where S is the rth member to enter the coalition.  Then r-1 business units have 
entered prior to S and n-r+1business units will enter after S.  Let J be the indexing set of the r-1 
business units that entered before S, and let J’ be the indexing set of the remaining n-r+1 business 
units. 
Then the marginal value attributed to S is 
  )       1 dVvdvvd
Jj
j
Jj
j
Jj
j  

 
 The number of occurrences for this value is the product of these parts: 
1. (r-1)! permutations of the r-1 elements of J 
2. (n-r+1)! permutations of the n-r +1 elements of J’. 
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3. 11  rn C  combinations of the r-1 elements of J. 
Since there are (n+1)! permutations of the n+1 players, the Shapley value for the service, SH(S), is 
given by 
           
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(which is equation (4A) in the main text) 
 
Part 2: Bi enters the coalition before S 
Suppose that S is not already part of the coalition when Bi enters. Let J be the indexing set of the r-1 
business units that entered before S (so that neither S nor Bi are indexed by J), and let J’ be the 
indexing set of the remaining n-r business units.   
Then the marginal value attributed to Bi in this case is: 
i
Jj
ji
Jj
j vvvv  

 
The number of occurrences for this value is the product of these parts: 
1. (r-1)! permutations of the r-1 elements of J (excluding Bi) 
2. (n-r)! permutations of the n-r elements of J’(excluding Bi) 
3. 11  rn C  combinations of the r-1 elements of J. 
4. n-r+1 ways to place S among the elements of J’ 
The sum of marginals in this case for Bi, M1(Bi), is given by: 
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Part 3: Bi enters the coalition after S 
Suppose that S is already part of the coalition when Bi enters. J and J’ are defined as in Part 2. 
Then the marginal value attributed to Bi in this case is:  
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The number of occurrences for this value is the product of these parts: 
1. (n-1)! ways to choose n-1 business units other than Bi 
2. (r-1) ways to choose a slot for S, given that Bi is the rth to enter 
The sum of marginals in this case for Bi, M2(Bi), is given by: 
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As in Part 1 there are (n+1)! permutations of the n+1 players.  Therefore the Shapley value for Bi is 
given by: 
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(which is equation (4B) in the main text) 
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